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UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES DID
CONGRESS INTEND TO AWARD
PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR. VICTIMS OF
UNLAWFUL INTENTIONAL
DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII?
INTRODUCTION
Mary Ann Luciano had a bright future at Olsten Corporation
("Olsten").' She began working at the company in 1987 as Director of
Field Marketing and received commendable performance appraisals.)
Despite Luciano's excellent evaluations, Olsten's senior male execu-
tives were displeased with her rapid rise in the company," They opposed
Luciano's promotion to vice president and even cajoled her to accept.
a lower position in the company by promising her a future promotion. 4
In response to Luciano's success, the company's executives drew up an
impossible job description for her new position that was designed to
ensure an unsatisfactory performance.' In June of 1992, Luciano was
fired because her position was being eliminated as part of a corporate
reorganization.'' She neither received her promised promotion, nor
was she considered for the two new executive positions created by the
reorganization.'
In November of 1993, Luciano filed suit in a New York federal
court against Olsten and its executive officers for sex discrimination.'"
Luciano alleged that Olsten violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VII" or '1964 Act") by failing to grant her a promised
promotion and by subsequently 'terminating her, as well as other fe-
male managers and officers, because of her sex." Following a month-
1 See Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 213-14 (2d Cir. 1997).





See bulano, 1 10 F.3d at 214.
7 See id.
8 See LUCI:1110 v. Olsten Corp., 912 F. Stipp. 663, 666 (E.D.N.Y. 1096), aff'd. 110 F.3d 210,
221-22 (2c1 Cir. 1097). Luciano also filed suit under the New York State litnnatt Rights Law for
gender-based discrimination. See Luciano, 110 F.3d at 213; see also N.Y. Lux. LAw § 290 et seq.
(McKinney 1993).
9 See Luciano, 012 F. Stipp. at 066, The 1064 Act makes it illegal for an employer to discrimi-
nate against an individual in the employment setting because of the individual's race, color,
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long trial, the jury returned a verdict in Luciano's favor.'" In addition
to compensatory, back pay and emotional distress damages, Luciano
was awarded $300,000 in punitive damages."
Like Luciano, Carole Kolstad was a rising star at the American
Dental Association (the "Association"). 12 Kolstad began working for the
Association in 1988 as a staff attorney in its Washington, D.C. office.' 3
She received numerous distinguished performance evaluations and
became an integral part of the Association's lobbying efforts." In 1992,
when Kolstad's supervisor announced his retirement, Kolsrud was one
of two candidates considered for the position.'' Despite her qualifica-
tions, she was not promoted, and the position was given to the male
applicant.'"
In July of 1994, Kolstad filed suit against the Association' alleging
Title VII sex discrimination." Although Kolstad brought her action in
a District of Columbia federal court, she made allegations similar to
those made by Luciatto.'i' Kolstad claimed that the Association failed
to promote her to a senior director position because of her sex, and
moreover, that the Association altered the directorship's job desctip-
religion, sex or national origin. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat.
241, 255 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000h.(1904)). Section 703(a) of
the 1964 Act provides that:
(a) It shall be an milawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to him or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive ally individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect - his status as an employee, because of midi individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Slat, 241, 255 (codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1904)).
to See Luciano, 912 F. Supp. at 666.
'' See Luciano, 110 F.3d at 214. The jury awarded Luciano $5,000,002 in punitive damages,
but the district court judge ordered that the punitive damages au-al d be reduced to $300,000
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(h)(3)(1)). See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (1994) (limiting the sum
of Title VII compensatory and punitive damages); Luciano, 110 F.3d at 214.
12 See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 961 (D.C. Cif. 1998), vacated, 119 S.
Ct. 2118, 2130 (1999) ("lio/stud 1").




17 See Kolstad 1, 139 F.3d at 961.
18 SITKolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 912 F. Supp. 13, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1996), alp en butte,
139 F.3d 058, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1008), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2130 (1999).
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tion and responsibilities to tailor the poSition to the male applicant.°
Although the jury found in favor of Kolstad and awarded her back pay,
Kolstad did not receive any punitive damages. 20 In fact, the district
court judge dismissed Kolstad's punitive damages claim before it even
reached the jury, because the Association's conduct was not egregious
enough to support a punitive damages award. 2 '
Despite the similar discriminatory treatment of Carole Kolstad
and Mary Ann Luciano by their employers, the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals came to starkly different conclusions regarding
the appropriate circumstances to award punitive damages under Title
VII. 22 Whereas the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Luciano v. Olsten.
Corp. determined that proof of unlawful intentional discrimination was
enough to support an award of punitive damages, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n ("Kolstad 1") held
that Title VII punitive damages may be imposed only upon a showing
of egregious conduct, above proof of unlawful intentional discrimina-
tion.'s This circuit court disagreement exemplified the confusion and
uncertainty that permeated federal courtrooms regarding the appro-
priate circumstances for awarding Title VII punitive damages. 24
In June 1999, ill . Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n ("Kolstad II"),
the Supreme Court of the United States considered the circumstances
See Kolstad I, 139 F.3d at 1160-61.
"See id. al 961.
21 See id.
21 Compare Luciano, 110 Elid at 213-14, 220, with Kolstad 1, 139 F.3d at ' 60-62.
23 See Koistad 1, 1311 1.3d at 950; Luciano, 110 F.3d at 220.
21 See Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 Eikl 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1998), re.rt. denied, 119
S. CA, 2015 (1999) (interpreting § 1981a to require plaintiffs seeking punitive damages to make
a showing beyond the threshold level of intent requited for compensatory damages); Kolstad
139 1.3d at 960 (requiring heightened showing of egregious conduct for Title VII punitive
damages); Harris v. L & I. Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 983 (4th Cir. 1997) (requiring a higher
standard above mere proof of intentional discrimittation for the award of punitive damages);
F.mmel v. Coca-Cola Iluttliiig Co., 95 F.3d 627, 036 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that punitive damages
require proof of more than intentional unlawful discrimination); Karcher v. Emerson Elec. Co.,
94 F.3d 502, 509 (8111 Cir. 1990) (awarding of punitive damages requites a showing of more than
intentional discrimination); Turk v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211. 1216 (6th Cir. 1095)
(slating that employer's comIttet did not rise to the level necessary to support a Title VII punitive
damages award); but sceAdakai v. Front Row Seat, No. 96.4249, 1997 WL 003458, at *2 (10th Cir.
Oct. 1. 1997) (stating that extraordinarily egregious conduct not necessary to support a punitive
damages award), and Luciano, 110 F.3d at 210-220 (complaining party not required to make an
additimtal showing beyond iirouf of intentional unlawful discrimination to obtain a putative
damages award); my atso Jeffrey Scot Fowler, Atutotatio11, Punitive Damages in Actions for Violations
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a; 42 U.5'.C.A. ,fi§ 2000e et seq.), 150
A.L.R. FED. 601, 518-10 (1908) (noting division among circuit coutts regarding the appropriate
circumstances under which Title VII intuitive damages may be awarded).
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under which punitive damages may be awarded in a Title VII action."'
The Court held that an employer's conduct does not have to be
egregious to satisfy § 1981a's requirements for punitive damages. 28
Rather, punitive damages may be awarded when the employer acted in
the face of a perceived risk that its actions would violate Title VII. 27
Thus, under the Kolstad II Court's rationale, the determining factor in
awardhig Title VII punitive damages is the employer's state of mind,
and not the egregiousness of its misconduct. 28
Originally, under the 1964 Act, punitive damages were not avail ,
able to complaining' parties for unlawful intentional discrimination . 29
In 1991, however, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991
Act") which amended the 1964 Act and added compensatory and
punitive damages as a Title VII remedy for unlawful intentional dis-
crimination." The 1991 Act, as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a
(",§ 1981a") greatly altered the landscape of employment discrimina-
tion law by creating additional remedies to deter unlawful intentional
discrimination and by providing greater protection to discrimination
victims. 8 '
25 See 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2121 (1999) ("Kolstad
26
 See id. at 2124, 2126.
27 See id. at 21'25.
28 See id. at 21'24.
29 See Civil Rights Act of 1904, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 700(g). 78 Stat. 241, 261 (authorizing
courts to enjoin respondelits front engaging iu unlawful employment practices and to order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate); Franks v. Bosnian TIIIR-Sp. Cu., 424 U.S. 747, 764-65,
770 (1076) (Eliding instatement, prohibitory injunction and retroactive seniority to be appropri-
ate remedies under § 700(g)); see also Fowler, supra note 24, at 610-17.
3° See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (1091)
(codified as amended in scattered sections oft U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1081,
1981a, 2000e (1904)); Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45
RUTGERS L. REv. 921, 924 (1993); see also Statement of President George Rush Upon Signing S.
1745, 27 WEEKLY Cosir. PRES. Doc. 1701 (Nov. 25, 1991), reprinted in 1091 U.S.C.C.A.N. 708,
7684i9. Section 102 (a)(1) of the 1991 Act states that: "the complaining patty may recover
compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (14 of this section, in addition to
any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1064 . . ." Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-106, § 102(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (a) (1)
(1994)); see Latalgraf v. US1 Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 253-54 (109.1) (noting that § 102(a) (1)
of Elie 1991 Act significantly expands the monetary relief potentially available to plaintiffs to
include compensatory and punitive damages).
31 See Civil Rights Act of 1091, Pub. L. No. 102-160, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (purposes of
1991 Act include providing appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and tudawful
harassment ill the workplace and expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination); see also Belton, SUM note 29, at 924.
Forty-two U.S.C. § 1981 a(a) (1) (1094) states:
(a) Right of recovery
(1) Civil rights
In an action brought by a complaining party under 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights
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Forty-two. U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1) ("§ 1981a(a)(1)") allows a com-
plaining party to recover compensatory and punitive damages for Title
VII unlawful intentional discritnination. 32 Compensatory damages
make discrimination victims whole for the injuries to their careers,
health and self respect caused by their employers' unlawful conduct."
Punitive damages, on the other hand, punish employers for their
unlawful conduct, reinforce the public policy against discrimination
and add to the deterrent value of a damages award." Forty-two U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b) (1) ("§ 1981a(b) (1)") permits complaining parties to re-
cover punitive damages where the complaining party has shown that
the respondent "engaged in a discriminatory practice or discrimina-
tory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved party."35 Whereas § 1981a(a) (1) cre-
ates additional Title VII remedies in order to deter unlawful inten-
tional discrimination in the workplace, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3)
("§ 1981a(h) (3)") places limits on the amount of compensatory and
Act of 1964 . , against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimi-
nation (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate ingiact)
. and provided that the complaining party cannot recover matey section 1981 of
this title, the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages
as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , from the respondent.
Id.
It is important to note that the 1991 Act allows for compensatory and punitive damages for
unlawful, intentional discrimination. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub, L. No, 102-166,
§ 102(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1) (1994)), The Supreme
Court has recognized two theories of discrimbuition under Tide VII: disparate treatment and
disparate impact. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609-11 (1993); International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 11.15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co„ 401 U.S. 424; 432-34 (1971); see also Judith J. Johnson, A Standard for Punitive Damages
under Title VII, 46 FLA. L. Rev. 521, 524-26 (1994). While the "disparate treatment" theory
describes actions of an employer that intentionally discriminated against au employee based on
the individual's race, sex, religion, color, or 'rational origin, the "disparate intpact" theory applies
to facially neutral employment practices that nevertheless have a disproportionate impact on one
group protected by Title VII, See Biggins, 507 U.S. at 609-11; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15;
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432-34. Because "disparate treatment" cases involve intentional discrimination,
and "disparate impact" cases do not, compensatory and punitive damages under the 1991 Act.
are only available in "disparate treatment" cases. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub, L. No. 102-160,
§ 102(0(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 198 la(a) (1) (1994)).
"See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (I) (1994). Section 1981a(a) (1) enables complaining parties to
recover compensatory and punitive damages for Title VII unlawful intentional discrimitration
provided that they cannot recover compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1).
" See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 64-65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603,
34 See 137 CONC. REC. 1-19526 (Nov, 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards),
35 See. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b) (1) (1994); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 102(b) (1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073.
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punitive damages awarded to a complaining party, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b) (2) ("§ 1981a(b) (2)") excludes backpay and interest on
backpay from compensatory damages awards."'' Finally, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(c) ("§ 1981a(c)") provides that, in cases where the complain-
ing party is seeking compensatory or punitive damages, either party
may demand a jury trial."?
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Kolstad //clarifies Title
VII punitive damages, a - larger question looms in the aftermath of the
decision: Did Congress intend to award punitive damages based on the
employer's state of mind?" Despite the Kolstad II decision, this Note
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2), (3) (1994); see also Civil Rights Act of 1901, Pub.	 No.
102-166, §§ 2, 3, 105 Slat. 1071, 1073 (1991). 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) provides:
(3) Limit:idol is. The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under
this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
mental anguish, loss of eijoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the
amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each
complaining party—
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current of preceding
calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has inure than 100 and fewer than 201
employees in each of .20 or more calendar weeks in the current of preceding
calendar year, $100,000; -
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current of preceding
calendar year, $200,000;
(D) in die case of a respondent who has more than 500 in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current of preceding calendar year, $300,000.
Civil Rights Act of 1091, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(b)(3), 105_Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991) (codified
in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (1994)).
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994).
38
 Before the Kolstad II opinion, the circuit courts were split on the appropriate standard for
Title VII Intuitive damages. See Kolstarl II, 119 S. Ct. at 2123. Some circuit courts have interpreted
§ 1981a (b)(1) to require a heightened showing of discriminatory action, above into Monal
discrimination, to recover punitive damages. Other circuit courts have held, however, that puni-
tive damages way be awarded only upon a showing of unlawful intentional discrimination. See
Nga, 140 F.3d at 1304 (interpreting the language of § 1981a to require plaintiffs seeking punitive
damages to make a showing beyond the threshold level of intent required for compensatory
damages); Kolslad 1, 139 F.3d at 960 (requiting heightened showing of egregious conduct for
punitive damages to be awarded under Title VII); Harris, 132 F.3d at 983 (requiring a higher
standard above mere proof of intentional discrimination for the award of punitive damages);
Emmet, 95 F.3d at 636 (stating that punitive damages require proof of more than intentional
unlawful discrimination); Karcher, 94 F.3d at 509 (awarding of punitive damages requires a
showing of more than intentional discrimination); Thric, 85 F.3d at 1216 (holding that employers
conduct did not rise to the level to support a punitive damages award tinder Title VII); bat see
Adakai, 1907 WL 603458, at *2 (extraordinarily egregious conduct not needed to support a
finding of punitive damages); Luciano, 110 F.3d at 219-20 (complaining party not required to
make an additional showing beyond proof of intentional unlawful discrimination to obtain an
award of punitive damages under § 1981a); see generally Fowler, supra note 24, at 631-52; Michael
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argues in favor of an egregious conduct requirement for Title VII
punitive damages?) The structure of § 1981a, as well as the legislative
materials and the circumstances surrounding the statute's enactment,
all point to the conclusion that Congress intended to award punitive
damages only for egregious conduct."
Part I examines the punitive damages standards of other civil
rights statutes, and analyzes the circumstances under which courts have
awarded punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983
("§ 1981" or "§ 1983").41 Part II reviews the 1991 Act's legislative history
pertaining to the punitive damages provision: 12 Part III discusses how
courts interpreted -§ 1981a(b) (1) before the Supreme Court's decision
in Kolstad II, focusing on the different circumstances under which Title
VII punitive damages were awarded.4M Part IV discusses _the Supreme
Court's decision in Kolstad H and its resolution of the split among the
circuits. 44 Part V contrasts the Kolstad II decision with an alternative
resolution of the circuit split that focuses on Congress's intent in
enacting § 1981a(b) (1). 45 In particulat Part V argues that, although
§ 1981a(b) (1) 's plain language provides little guidance in discerning
Congress's. intent, the statute's legislative history, its structure, the
circumstances surrounding, its enactment and its purpose demonstrate
a congressional intent to impose Title VII punitive damages only under
egregious circumstances." Thus, whereas complaining parties may al-
ways expect to be fully compensated for injuries resulting from an
employer's unlawful intentional practices, Congress intended to re-
serve punitive damages for only the worst cases of intentional discrimi-
natio11.47
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES
Although § 1981a enables discrimination victims to recover puni-
tive and compensatory damages, punitive damages, in general, serve
I Wise, Note, COU;'l Disregards Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Bucks Curren!
nends Regarding Punitive Damages: Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 108 E3d 1431 (D.C. Cir.
1996), 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 643,049,58 (1998); Johnson, supra note 31, at 546-61.
39 See infra notes 216-90 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 216-96 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 48-104 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 105-37 and accompanying text.
13 See 1.00 notes 138-99 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 200-15 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 216-96 and accompanying text.
•6 See infra•notes 210-96 and accompanying text..
17 See infra notes 216-96 and accompanying text.
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different purposes than other damage awards. 48 In tort law, compensa-
tory damages make victims whole for their injuries. Punitive damages,
on the other hand, punish past conduct, teach defendants not to
commit these acts again and deter others from similar behavior. 49
Something more than a mere commission of a tort is required for
punitive damages?
Similar to the monetary damages available in tort law, compensa-
tory damages under § 1981a are necessary to make discrimination
victims whole for injuries to their careers, health, self respect and
dignity.' Section 1981a punitive damages, on the other hand, punish
employers' past discriminatory conduct and deter future civil rights
violations in the workplate.52 Moreover, § 1981a punitive damages raise
the cost of employers' discrimination, thereby providing employers
with additional incentives to prevent workplace discrimination. 53 Like
§ 1981a, other federal civil rights statutes award punitive damages for
discriminatory conduct."' Many circuit courts have examined §§ 1981
and 1983 for guidance in interpreting § 1981a's punitive damages
provision.55
18 See LandgnIf v. USI Filial Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 252-53 (1994); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,
36 it.5 (1983); Carey v. Piphtts, 435 U.S. 247, 254-59 (1978); Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v.
Aim's, 91 U.S. 489, 492 (1875); RESTATENIENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs §§ 901 cult. a, 903, 908 (1965);
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON nit LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions,
Problems and Reform, Vit.L. L. REV. 363, 373-82 (1994).
49 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, § 2.
See RESTATENIENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 908 clin. b (1965); PROSSER & KEETON, Stlpia note
48, § 2.
33 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 64-65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.S.C.A.N, 549, 602-03.
52 See
" See 137 CONG. Rec. 119526 (Nov. 7, 1991) (Interpretive Menlo of Rep. Edwards); I -1.R. REP.
No. 102-40(1), at 64-65, 69, 79 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.S.C.A.N. 549, 602-03, 607, 608.
54 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1994); see also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1983);
Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277-78 (D.C. Ch .. 1995); Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners,
Inc., 848 F.2d 484, 480-90 (4th Cir: 1988); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2(1 194, 205-07
(1st Cir. 1987); '4Villiainson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1295-97 (7th Cir. 1987);
Beauforcl v. Sisters of Mercy-Province of Detroit, Inc., 816 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (6th Cir. 1987);
Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2(1'1135, 1146-48 (11th Cir. 1986).
33 See Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3c1 1299, 1301-04 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed,
119 S. Ct. 2015 (1999); Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2130 (1999) ('Kolstad 1"); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 220
(2c1 Cir. 1997); see also 137 CONG. REC. 1-19526 (Nov. 7, 1991) (Interpretive Memo of Rep.
Edwards); H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 70 (1991), reprinted in 1991 . U.S.C.C.A.N. 540, 608; FI.R.
REP. No. 102-40(11), at 29 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 722-23; Johnson, supra
note 31, at 538.
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Section 1981 bans intentional racial discrimination in the creation
and enforcement of contracts. 56 Initially, it was enacted by Congress to
give meaning to the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 57 Within the last thirty years, § 1981 has also been applied
in the private employment context because courts have determined
that the right to contract for employment falls within the ambit of the
statute.'
Section 1983, on the other held, establishes a tort-like remedy for
individuals deprived of federally protected rights "under color of law." 59
The law was intended to override discriminatory or otherwise uncon-
stitutional state laws and to provide a remedy for civil rights violations
where state law was inadequate or unavailable in practice." Although
the language of § 1983 does not set out a punitive damages standard,
the United States Supreme Court. has provided guidance on this issue
in the seminal case of Smith v. Wade. 61
56 See 42 U,S.C. § 1981; .see ABIGAIL COOLEY MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
§ 10:06 (3d ed. 1998), Section ,1981 provides:
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to !stake and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefits of all laws iind proceedings for the
security of personsaind property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject .
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and to no other,
42 U.S.C., § 1981.
57 See MODJESKA, supra note 56, § 10:06. The Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution
states that "litleither slavery nor involuntary •servitude . . . shall exist within the United States
.." U.S. CoNsT. amend, XIII, § 1.
58 See MonjtsKA, supra note 56, § 10:06; s(r also General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n V. Pennsyl-
vania, 458 U.S. 375, 387-88 (1982); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S, 409, 437 (1968).
59 Sil! 42 § 1983; see also Jack M. Keermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with
Special Attention to Soured of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 51 (1989); Johnson, supra note 31, at 538;
MODJESKA, supra note 56, § 10:03; CHARLES R. RICHIE, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS §§ 4:35, 4:36 (2d ed. 1998). Forty-two
U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 	 or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subject, or causes tO be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
60 See Mitcluinr v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (11)72); see also MowsKA, supra tote: 56,
§ 10:03; RuailL, supra note 59, §§ 4:35, 4:36, Section 1983 was derived from the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 34; see alsaKti Klux Kiwi Act of 1871, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13,
13.
61 See Smith, 461 U.S: at 56; Carry, 435 U.S. at 254-59; see also Beerinann, supra note 59, at
51; Johnson, supra note 31, at 539.
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In 1983, the Supreme Court laid out the appropriate standard for
§ 1983 punitive damages in Smith.° The Court held that a jury may be
permitted to assess § 1983 punitive damages when the defendant's
conduct is shown "to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it
involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected
rights of others."6" In Smith, an inmate at a reformatory brought suit
under § 1983 against three correctional officers for violation of his
Eighth Amendment tights under the United States Constitution." The
inmate alleged that the officers confined him with other inmates who
harassed, beat and sexually assaulted him.'" The district judge entered
a directed verdict for two of the officers and the jury found in the
inmate's favor against the third officer and awarded punitive dam-
ages 66 The officer 'appealed the punitive damages award and argued
that the trial judge's punitive damages standard was incorrect.'''
Although the officer in Smith argued that the proper punitive
damages standard is one of actual nialicious intent, the Gotta reasoned
that a large majority of state and lower federal courts agreed that pu-
nitive damages awards did not require a malicionS or intentional state
of mind. 68
 The Court observed that these lower courts have permitted
punitive awards on various standards of negligence, recklessness or
other culpable conduct short of actual malicious intent, 69
 The Court
stated, moreover, that most state common law cases follow the rule, as
articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2), that punitive
62 See Smith, 461 U.S. at 56; see also Johnson, supra note 31, at 539.
62
 See Smith, 461 U.S. at 56.
41 See id. al 32; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, not
excessive flies imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted.").
65 See Smith, 461 U.S. at 32.
66 See id. at 33.
67 See id. at 32. Because the officer had qualified immunity as a prison official, the judge
instructed the jury that the inmate could recover only if the defendants were guilty of gross
negligence—defined as "a callous indifference or a thoughtless disregard for the consequences
of one's act or failure to act"—or -..egregious failure to protect" that inmate. See id. at 33. The
judge defined "egregious failure to protect" as "a flagrantly or remarkably bail failure to protect."
See id. In addition, the judge charged that the jury could award punitive damages in order to
punish the wrongdoer for some extrautdinary misconduct and to serve as au example or warning
to others if:
[The jury] find[s] the issue in favor of the plaintiff, and if the conduct of one or
more of the defendants is shown to be a reckless or callous disregard of, or
indifference to, the lights or safety of others, then [the jury] may assess punitive
or exemplary diimages in addition to at iy award of actual damages ... .
See Smith. 461 U.S. at 32.
6" Id. at 37-38,45. Iu particular, the officer argued that punitive damages should be awarded
only when the defendant acts with ill will, spite or intent to injure. See id.
69 See Id. at 45.
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damages may be awarded because of the defendant's evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the rights of others. 7° In addition, the Court
rejected use of the term "malice" in formulating a § 1983 punitive
damages standard to avoid its confusion and ambiguity. 7 ' The Court
stated that "malice" was a hopelessly versatile and ambiguous term that
carried a broad spectrum of meanings. 72
The Court also addressed the officer's argument that the thresh-
old for punitive damages should always be higher than the threshold
for liability. 77 The prison official argued that, because the jury instruc-
tions specified the same threshold for an award of punitive and com-
pensatory damages, the two forms of damages would be equally avail-
able to the plaintiff.'; The Court rejected this argument and observed
that punitive damages are never awarded as of right, no matter how
egregious the defendant's conduct. 75 The Court noted that there has
never been any general common law rule that the threshold for puni-
tive damages must always be higher than the threshold for compensa-
tory damages. 7" Therefore, the Court held that a jury may be permitted
to assess § -1983 punitive damages when the defendant's conduct is
shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves
reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of
others." In situations where the standard for compensatory liability is
as high as or higher than the usual threshold for punitive damages, no
extra showing of unlawful conduct is required for a .punitive damages
award. 78
Although the Court in Smith only addressed § 1983 punitive dam-
ages, lower courts have used the Supreme Court's rationale for guid-
ance in awarding punitive damages for cases brought under other civil
rights statuteS. 79 In particular, courts have relied on Smith in formulat-
ing a § 1981 punitive damages standard, but have reached different.
711 See id. at 46-48; see also RESTATENIENT (SMOND) OF Toirrs § 908(2) (1965).
71 See Smith, 461 U.S. at 37 11.9. The Court recognized that "malice" has (Wet cm meanings
hi different contexts. See id, For extunide, iu the Ilefamation context, "actual malice" refers to a
recklessness standard. See id. On the other hat id, "actual malice" may also refer to ill will, spite
or all intent to injure. See id. at 38.
72 See id. at 39 11.8.
73 See Smith, 461 U.S. at 51 -52.
7.4 See id.
71' See id.
71" See id. at 53.
77 See id. at 56.
78 See Smith, 461 U.S. at 53,56.
71) See Barbour; 48 F.3(1 at 1277; Stejthen.s., 848 F.241 at 480-90; Raudett, 832 F.2d at 205;
Williamson, 817 F.2d at 1206; Beaulard, 819 F.2d at 1108-09; Waiters, 803 F.2d at 1147; see also
joluisou, supra note 31, at 541-46; Wise, supra note 38, at 650-55.
1280	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW' 	 [Vol. 40:1269
conclusions regarding the appropriate circumstances for this remedy. 8°
This discrepancy regarding the appropriate § 1981 punitive damages
standard resulted from the misapplication of the Smith standard by
several circuit courts.' [
In 1987, in Rowlett v. Anheuser
-
Busch, Inc., the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a finding of unlawful inten-
tional discrimination under § 1981, without More, is enough to award
punitive damages. 82 In Rowlett, a black employee brought a § 1981
lawsuit against Anheuser-Busch, Inc. ("Anheuser-Busch") alleging ra-
cial discrimination in training, pay raises and discharge.'' [ After deter-
mining that the state's personal injury statute of limitations did not bar
the employee's § 1981 action and that there was sufficient evidence to
support unlawful intentional discrimination, the court addressed the
jury's punitive damages award of three million dollars. 84
Anheuser-Busch attacked the punitive damages standard used by
the jury. 85
 The company argued that something more than intentional
discrimination is necessary for punitive damages and that the miscon-
duct must be extraordinary or outrageous.86 The court rejected An-
heuser-Busch's argument, however, noting that, according to Smith, the
state of mind necessary for § 1983 liability is at least as culpable as the
state of mind necessary for punitive datnages. 87 The court observed
that although the threshold for punitive damages under Smith need
not be higher than that for compensatory liability, the trier of fact
still must decide whether punitive damages should be awarded using
its "discretionary moral judgment."88
 Thus, whereas punitive damages
may be awarded in every case of a § 1981 intentional wrong, the trier
of fact has discretion to determine whether the circumstances warrant
the award." Finally, the court observed that Smith's language does not
indicate that the misconduct must be extraordinary or outrageous to
support a punitive damages award. 9° Therefore, the Rowlett court held
86 See Barbour, 48 F.3{1 at 1277; Stephens, 848 F.2d at 489-90; Rowlett, 832 F.2d at 205;
Williamson, 817 F.2d at 1296; Beaufoni, 816 F.2d at 1108-09; Waiters, 803 F.28 at 1147.
81 See infra notes 82-104 and accompanying text.
82 See Rowlett, 832 F.2d at 206.
83 See id. at 195-96. The employee also hrought a Title VII action against Anheus•r-Busch,
and the jury found in favor of the employee for both the § 1981 and Title VII actions. The jiffy
awarded damages, however, based on the employee's § 1981 claim. See id. at 197.
SiSee id. at 198-204.
85 See id. at 205.
86
 See Rowlett, 832 F.2d at 205-06.
87 Setr id. at 205.
88 See id. at 206; see also Smith, 461 U.S. at 52.
8°
 See Rowlett, 832 F.2d al 205.
90 See rd. at 206.
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that § 1981 punitive damages may be awarded upon proof of inten-
tional discrimination."'
In 1987, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held, in Beauford v. Sisters of Mercy -Province of Detroit, Inc., that
§ 1981 punitive damages may be awarded only upon a showing of
"egregious conduct, willfulness, or malice on the part of the defen-
dants."' In Beauford, a black employee brought a § 1981 suit against
his employer, a high school, for race discrimination.•" The employee
alleged that he was denied promotions, treated differently and reas-
signed job responsibilities because of his race.•' Whereas the jury found
for the employee and awarded him nominal and punitive damages, the
district court granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, ordered a new trial and entered judgment for the
defendant." The employee appealed the district court's ruling.""
After finding sufficient evidence to support § 1981 intentional
discrimination, the Sixth Circuit addressed the defendant's conten-
tion that the evidence was insufficient to support a punitive damages
award.° The court, applying the Smith standard, stated that § 1981
punitive damages should he awarded only in cases involving egregious
conduct or a showing of willfulness or malice" on the part of the
defendant."8 In particular, the court noted that punitive damages in
civil rights case law "has generally been limited to cases involving
egregious conduct or a showing of willfulness or malice . ..'"'`'t The
court determined that, although there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port an intentional discrimination claim, "no testimony was adduced
evidencing the requisite malice or reckless or callous indifference of
an egregious character" to support a punitive damages award.m Thus,
the Beauford court held that egregious conduct beyond mere intent to
discriminate is required for § 1981 punitive damages,"
Therefore, although the circuit courts have relied on the Smith
standard for guidance in awarding § 1981 punitive damages, they have
"See id. The court determined, however, that a three million dollar punitive damages award
was excessive, and lowered the award to $300,000. See id. at 207.
92 See Branford, 816 F.2d at 1109.
95 See id, at 1106.
91 See id. at 1106-07.
95 See id, at 1107.
96 See id.
97 See. Beauford, 816 F.2d at 1107-09.
99 See id. at 1108-09.
•• See id. at 1109,
lop sr, id,
101 See id. at 1108-09.
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come to different conclusions regarding the appropriate circum-
stances for the remedy. 102
 Whereas some circuit courts, like the First
Circuit in Rowlett, have held that a finding of § 1981 discrimination is
enough to support a punitive damages award, other circuit 'courts,
notably the Sixth Circuit in Beauford, have held that egregious conduct
is required for § 1981 punitive damages. 103 In 1991, Congress would
rely on the courts' varying and inconsistent interpretations of § 1981
punitive damages when formulating the Title VII punitive damages
standard. 1 °4
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
After a failed attempt in 1990 to amend Title VII, Congress re-
newed its efforts to strengthen federal fair employment laws with the
introduction of a new civil rights bill in the House of Representatives
on January 3, 1991. 105 Although Congress wanted to provide greater
protection for employees from invidious workplace discrimination, it
did not want to draft a "quota bill" that would create powerful incen-
11)2
 SeeJackson v. Pool Mortgage Co., 858 F.2d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that while
evidence stippurted the award of compensatory damages, the evidence was insufficient to support
an award of punitive damages); Stephens, 848 F.2d at 489 (evidence sufficient to support a finding
of § 1981 intentional discrimination may notietheless be inadequate to support an :mulling of
punitive damages); Walters, 803 F.2d at 1147 (while there was adequate evidence to support jury's
finding of § 1081 ituentional discrimination, the defendants did not act with the requisite ill will
or callous disregard to support awarding of punitive damages); but see Barbour; 48 F.3(1 at 1277
(evidence sufficient to establish an intentional violation of protected civil tights may suffice to
permit the jury to award punitive damages); Williamson, 817 F.2 I as 1296"(intentional, illegal
conduct may support ;ni award of punitive damages); see get nil) Kolstatl, 130 F.3(1 at 963-64
(recognizing split among circuits regarding the standard for punitive damages under § 1981);
Wise, supra note 38, at 651-52.
1 °3 See Barbour, 48 F.3(1 at 1277; Stephens, 848 F.2d at 489-90; Rowlett, 832 F.2d at 205;
Williamson, 817 F.2(1 at 1'296; Branford, 816 F.2d at 1108-09; Wafters, 803 F.2d at 1147.
1 °1 See Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1277; Stephens, 848 F.2(1 at 489-00; Rowlett, 832 F.2d at 205;
Williamson, 817 F.2d at 1296; Beaufort', 816 F.2d at 1108-09; Walters, 803 F.2(1 at 1147; see also
H.R. Rio'. No. 102-40 pt. 1, at 74 (1091), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 612; H.R. REP. No.
102-40 pt. 11, at 29 (1991), nininted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 694, 722-23; 137 CONG. REG. 110526
(Nov. 7, 1991) (Interpretive Memo of Sen. Edwards).
t°5 See H.R. I. 102d Cong. § 2(h) (1991); see also 47 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1991
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 251-52 (1902) [hereinafter 1991 C.Q. ALMANAC'. Presi-
dent Bosh vetoed a 1990 version of a civil rights bill entitled the Civil Rights Act of 1990. See 136
CONG. REC. 516,457 (Oct. 22. 1990); 46 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1990 CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY ALMANAC 473 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 C.Q. Au.iANAcJ; Carpi Leslie !ailing, Note,
The Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Examination of the Storm Preceding the Compromise of America's
Civil Rights, 9 lion . rtsA L. REV. 215. 217 (1991). One of the principle reasons for President Bush's
veto was the fear that the 1090 civil rights bill would "introduce the destructive forces of quotas
into our nation's employment system." See 1991 C.Q. ALMANAC, MOM, at 251-52; Lining, supra,
at 217.
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tives for employers to adopt hiring and promotion quotas to avoid Title
VII liability. 1116 In particular, President Bush viewed the 1990 legislation
as "introducing the destructive force of quotas into our nation's em-
ployment system," and vowed to veto any new civil rights legislation
which had the same effects. 107
A key feature of the new House bill was a provision establishing
new monetary remedies for victims of intentional job discrimination. 118
According to the bill, in the case of intentional job discrimination, a
complaining party is entitled to receive compensatory damages and,
if the respondent (other than a government, government
agency, or a political subdiVision) engaged in the unlawful
employment practice with malice, or with reckless or callous indif-
ference to the federally protected rights of others, punitive damages
may be awarded against such respondent; in addition to the
relief authorized by the preceding sentences of this subsec-
tion, except that compensatory damages shall not include
backpay or any interest thereon. 1 °9
This provision was intended to Make the remedies available for sex,
religious and national origin discrimination the same as the reme-
dies already available under § 1981 for race discrimination."' After
five months of vigorous debate, the House passed the new civil
rights bill in June 1991. 111 In addition to articulating a Title VII
punitive damages standard, the final bill stated that the sum of
compensatory and punitive damages would not exceed $150,000. 112
As the House voted on its civil rights bill, the Senate began to
consider its own civil rights legislation. 113 The original Senate legisla-
tion was divided into three bills to isolate the most difficult topics and
106 See, e.g., 137 CONG.. Rec. 515,472 (Oct. 30, 1991) (legislation drafted imm a way not to three
employers to resort to quotas); Statenient of President George Bush upon Signing S. 1745, 27
WEEKLY COMP. PRES, Doc, 1701 (Nov. 25, 1991) (1991 Act will not lead In quotas).
'° 7 See 136 CONG. REC. 516,457 (Oct. 22, 1900); 1990 C.Q. ALMANAC, .SUPtri note . 105, at 472.
la" See H.R. 1, 102d Cot Lg. § 8 (introduced in House Jan. 3, 1991); 1991 C.Q. ALMANAC, SWAM
note 105, at 253.
100 1-1.8, 1, 102d Cong. § 8 (emphasis added).
1 " See H.R. Rex. No. 102-40 pt. I, at 74, (1991), up-tinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 549, 612
(referring to a version of H.R. I that was reviewed by the Committee on the judiciary and which
contained the same language as § 8 of the original hill),
In See H,R. 1, 102d Cong. § 106 (passc41 by House on June 5, 1991); 137 CONC.. Rae,
1.13922-28 (June 5, 1091); 1091 C.Q. AnstANAc, supra note 105, at 225.
112 See 14.R. 1, 102d Cong. § 106 (passed by House on June 5, 1991); 137 CONG. REC.
113922-28 (lone 5, 1991); 1991 C.Q. ALMANAC, supra note 105, at 255.
113 Sre 1991 C.Q. ALMANAC„SUPra note 105, at 255.
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to allow the less controversial proposals to pass.'" The Senate bill that
addressed monetary damages in job discrimination limited the amount
of compensatory damages available to an individual based on the size
of the individual's employer."' In addition, the bill authorized courts
to impose an "equitable civil penalty" on an employer if the courts
determine that the employer engaged in discriminatory practice "with
malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected tights of
an aggrieved individual."" 6
 The purpose of the equitable civil penalty
was to prevent the employer from engaging iu future discriminatory
practices. 117
The Senate eventually agreed on a compromise civil rights bill that
could win the support of the Bush administration."' The compromise
bill ("Senate Bill 1745") allowed a complaining party to recover puni-
tive damages if the party demonstrates that the respondent employer
engaged in discriminatory practices "with malice or with reckless indif-
ference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.""'
Further, the compromise bill set limits on compensatory and punitive
damages for discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin, depending on the employer's size. 120
The Senate passed Senate Bill 1745 on October 30, 1991 and
failed to take action on the House civil rights bill. 12 ' The House con-
sidered and passed Senate Bill 1745 on November 7, 1991. 122
 During
the House debate, Representative Hyde introduced an interpretive
memorandum into the record indicating that "[plunitive damages . .
are to be awarded only in extraordinarily egregious cases." 12' In addi-
114 See 1991 C.Q. ALMANAC, supra note 105, at 255; see also S. 1207, 102d Cong. (1091); S.
1208, 102d Cong. (1091); S. 1209, 102d Cong. (1991).
'' See S. 1209, 102d Cong. , §§ 2, 3(6)(3) (1991). If the employer has more than 100 employ-
ees each of 20 or more calendar Weeks, then compensatory damages can not exceed $150,000;
if the employer has 100 or fewer employees, each of 20 or more calendar weeks, then compen-
satory damages can not exceed $50,000. See S. 1209, 102d Cong. §§ 2, 3(b)(3).
116 .See S. 1209, 102c1 Cong. § 3(c)(1) (A) (1991).
117 See id.
118 See 1991 C.Q. ALMANAC, supra note 105, at 256.
"9 See S. 1745, 102d Cong. § 102(6)(1) (1991) (enacted); see also S. 1209, 102c1 Cong.
§ 3 (c)(I)(A) (1991).
125 See S. 1745, 102d Cong. § .102(3) (A)—(D) (1991) (enacted). Employers with 100 or fewer
workers were liable for up to $50,000; employers with 101 to 200 workers were liable up to
$100,000; employers with 201 to 500 workers were liable up to $200,000; and employers with more
than 500 workers were liable up to $300,000. Employers of fewer than 15 workers were exempt
damages, See id.
121 See I Cong. Index (CCH), at 35,001 (1992); 1991 C.Q,'AmsNAc, supra note 105, at 257,
260.
122 See 137 CONG. REC. 119557-58 (Nov. 7, 1991). 	 •
"3 See 137 CONG. REC. 1-19543 (Nov. 7, 1901) (statement by Rep. Hyde).
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Lion, Representative Edwards introduced an interpretive memoran-
dum into the record indicating that "[p]unitive damages are available
. . . to the same extent and under the same standards that they are
available to plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1981. No higher standard may be
imposed." 124 In Senate floor debate, Senator Dole also introduced an
interpretive memorandum discussing Senate Bill 1745's punitive dam-
ages provision.' 25 According to Senator Dole's memorandum, "[p]uni-
tive damages are also capped, and are to be awarded only in extraor-
dinarily egregious cases." 126 In signing into law Senate Bill 1745,
President Bush remarked that Senator Dole's interpretive memoran-
dum would be "treated as authoritative interpretive guidance by all
officials in the executive branch with respect to the law of disparate
impact as well as the other matters covered in the documents: 127
No Senate reports were submitted during the consideration or
passage of Senate Bill 1745. 125 Congress submitted reports, however,
relating to the House version of the civil rights bill that were authored
by the House Committee on Education and Labor and the House
Committee on the judiciary. 129 In House Report 40(1), the Committee
on Education and Labor addressed the concern that allowing punitive
damages may lead to vastly disproportionate jury verdicts in relation
to the injuries sustained by the complaining party:
[s] trict standards limit the recovery of damages by plaintiffs
with meritorious claims. Plaintiffs must first prove intentional
discrimination, then must prove actual injury or loss arising
therefrom to recover compensatory damages, and must meet
an even higher standard (establishing that the employer
acted with malice or reckless or callous indifference to their
rights) to recover punitive damages.'"
1 " See 137 CONG. REC. 1.195'26 (Nov. 7, 1991) (interpretive memorandum of Rep. Edwards).
125 See 137 CoNo, REG. S15,472-78 (Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole).
126 See 137 Cot4G, RF.c. 815,473 (Oct. 30, 1991).
121 See Staicithent of President George Bush Upon Signing S. 1745, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc, 1701 (Nov. 25, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A,N. 768, 768-69.
128 See 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 549.
129 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 1021-106, 105 Stat. 1071. 1071 (1991) (enacted
in House and Senate as S. 1745): KR. REP. No. 102-40(1) (1991) (Report by the 1 -louse
Committee on 1..''..dttcation and Labor); H,R, REP. No. 102-40(11) (1991) (Report by the House
Coil unit tee on' the Judiciary), The original House bill's punitive damages provision differecl front
,Senate Bill 1745's punitive damages provision. Compare H.R. 1, 102d Cong, § 8(B) (1991), with
S. 1745, 102d Gong. §102(b)(1) (1991). The House bill allowed punitive damages to be awarded
when the defendant engaged in discriminatory practices "with malice, or with reckless or callous
indifference to the federally !troweled rights of others." See H.R. 1, 102d Cong.§ 8(B).
11
"1-1.1t. REP. No. 10240(1), at 72 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 610.
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The Committee also noted that "[p] unitive damages would also be
available where the respondent ... engaged in an unlawful employ-
ment practice with malice, or with reckless or callous indifference
to the federally protected rights of others."" Moreover, the Com-
mittee stated that "[t] his language sets the same standard courts
have applied under section 1981 [42 U.S.C. § 1981]." 1 " Finally, the
Committee recognized that victims of unlawful discrimination un-
der § 1981 "are entitled . . . not only to equitable relief, but also
compensatory damages, and in particularly egregious cases, puni-
tive damages as well."'"
In House Report 40(II), the House Committee on the Judiciary
also briefly examined the punitive damages provision of the House's
civil rights There, the Committee noted that punitive damages,
would be available in cases of intentional discrimination where the
employer acted with "malice, or with reckless or callous indifference
to the federally protected rights of others." The Committee, recog-
nizing that this punitive damages standard is taken directly from civil
rights case law, cited to Smith v. Wade for support.'"6 In further discuss-
ing § 1981 punitive damages, House Report 40(II) stated, "42 U.S.C:
§ 1981 authorizes courts to award victims of intentional discrimination
in contracts not only equitable relief, but also compensatory damages,
and in appropriate cases, punitive damages as well."' 37
III. THE LAW BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED
KOLSTAD II— TITLE VII PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND
THE EGREGIOUS CONDUCT REQUIREMENT
Since the passage of the 1991 Act, the circuit courts have struggled
with interpreting § 1981a(b)(1).'" Whereas the First, Fourth, Sixth,
131 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 74 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549. (112.
132 See id.
133 See I.I.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.S.C.A.N. 549, 603.
134 See I.I.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), at 29 (11191), repiiiited in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 722-23.
135 See id.
136 See id.
' 37 See 1-I.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), at 25 (1901), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 718-19.
138 See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d, 989, 992-94 (911) Cir. 1998): Ngu v. Reno
Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed, 119 S. Ct. 2015 (1999);
Kolstail v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2118,
2130 (1999) ("Kolstad P'); Browning s'. President Riverlroat Casino—Mo., 139 F.3d 631, 637 (8d)
Cir. 1998); Harris v. L L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3(1 978, 982-83 (4th Cif. 1997): Adakai v. Front Row
Seat, No. 96-2249, 1997 603458, at "2 (10111 Cir. Oct. 1, 1997); Kiln v. Nash Finch Co., 123
F.3d 1046, 1065-66 (801 Cir. 1997); Sunna v. S-B Power Tool, 121 F.311 416, 422-23 (8th Cir.
1997); Titicher v. Wal-Mart Stores, 118 F.3d 1125, 1132-34 (7th Cir. 1997); Luciano v, Olsten
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Eighth, Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits have held that a
heightened showing of discriminatory conduct, above intentional dis-
crimination, is required to recover punitive damages, the Second and
Tenth Circuits have held that § 1981a(b) (1) punitive damages may be
• awarded merely upon proof of unlawful intentional discrimination." 9
Thus, the main issue that divided the circuits was whether proving
intentional discrimination is enough to get the punitive damages issue
to the jury. WO
Corp., 110 F.3c1 210, 220 (2d Cir. 1907); Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 07 F.3d 803,
800—I0 (5th Cir. 1996); Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores of bid., Inc., 103 F.3d 576, 581 (7th
Cir. 1990); Entine! v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 95 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1990); Varner v. National
Super Mts., Inc,, 94 E3d.1209, 1214 (8th Cir. 1996); Karcher v. Emerson Eke. Co., 94 Rid 502,
501) (8th Cir. 1996); Turk v. Holland Hospitality, Inc„ 85 F.3d 1211, 121(1 (6th Cir. 1006);
McKinnon v. Kwong Walt Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498, 509 (1st Cir. 1990); Pandazides v. Virginia Rd.
of Ethic., 13 F.3d 823, 830 n.9 (4111 Cir. 1094); Taylor v. Scoupolar Corp., 905 F. Stipp. 1072,
1080-81 (D. Ariz. 1998).
135 See cases cited supra note 138. It is unclear whether the Seventh Circuit supported a
heightened showing of egregious conduct to warrant punitive damages. Compare Merriweather,
103 F.3d at 581 (finding that proof of intentional discrimination may be sufficient to award
pintitive damages), with Thither, 118 F.3d al 1132-34 (requiring a higher standard for punitive
damages as compared to proving intentional discrimination), and Emmet, 95 F.3d at 636 (holding
that punitive damages requires tore than proof of intentional unlawful discrimination in the
workplace). Moreover, the Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have not expressly ruled on whether
a heightened showing of egregious conduct is necessary to support au award of punitive damages
under Tide VII. But see Farpella -Crosby, 97 F.3d at 809-10 (Fifth Circuit upheld jury's award of
compettsatory damages for unlawful inlentimml discriminati(n, but determined that no reason-
able juror could conclude that the employer acted with malice or with reckless indifference).
11 " Sri! 1 .4'0-Alert Storm, 156 F.3d at 902-94 (requiting plaintiff seeking punitive damages to
make a showing Iteyond the threshold level of intent requited fitr compensatctry liability); Ngo,
140 F.3d at 1304-05 (requiring plaintiff to make a showing beyond the threshold level of Mimi]
neecled for compensatory damages to recover punitive damages); Koishui I, 130 F.3d at 969
(requiring plaintiffs seeking punitive damages to make a showing beyond the threshold level of
intent required for compensatory liability); *owning, 139 F.3(1 at 037 (requiring, a showing of
wore than intentiOnal discrimimition to recoVer 'nutlike damages); Harris, 132 F.3d at 982-83
(punitive dal ['ages is an extraordinary remedy not to be awarded automatically in every successful
Title VII lawsuit); Thither, 118 F.3(1 at 1132-34 (requiring a higher standard file punitive damages
as comitated to proving intentional discrimination); Farpella -Cmsby, 97 F.3d at 809-10 (court
iluplics that a heightened showing, above that required to prove intentional discrimination, is
necessary to warratit a punitive damages award); Era awl, 95 117.3cl at 630 (Inthling that punitive
damages requites mote than proof of intentional unlawful discrimination in the workplace);
Varner, 04 F.3d at 1214 (requiring a showing of more than intentional discrimination to recover
punitive damages tinder the 1991 Act); Kamber, 94 F.3d at 509 (requiring a showing of more than
intentional discrimination to recover punitive damages under the 1991 Act); Thrie, 85 F.3d at
1210 (applying a higher standard for intuitive damages above that necessary for compensatory
damages); illekin non, 83 F.3d at 509 (holding that the standard lbr punitive damages requires a
heightened showing of reckless conduct as compared to proving intentional discrimination);
Pandazides, 13 F.3d at 830 ti.9 (requiring a heightened showing of discriminatory action, above
it nen tional discrimination, to recover punitive damages); Toyinr, 995 F. Stipp. al 1080-81 (requir-
ing a higher level of "uflensive conduct" to award punitive damages); but we Adaltai, 1097 WI.
003458, at *2 (holding that the requisite level of recklessness and outrageousness required to
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In 1998, in Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort cotp., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that § 1981a (b) (1) punitive
damages require egregious conduct by employers." In Ngo, a cocktail
server alleged that the Reno Hilton Resort ("Hilton") had discrimi-
nated against her by denying her a medical leave of absence because
of her race, national origin and sex.'''" She subsequently sought relief
under Title VII and other civil rights statutes."" Ngo appealed the
district court's judgment for Hilton on her punitive damages claim and
argued that she was entitled to receive a punitive damages award based
upon her proof of intentional discritnination." 4
In rejecting plaintiff's arguments, the court noted that the § 1981a
punitive damages standard tracks the standard applied under §§ 1981
and 1983.' 4' The court recognized that although most courts purport
to adopt the Smith v. Wade rationale in § 1981 cases, some courts have
actually misapplied the Smith standard by requiring a heightened evi-
dentiary showing for punitive damages. 146 The court stated that, ac-
cording to § 1981a's legislative history, Congress adopted the misap-
plied Smith formulation that required egregious conduct for punitive
damages awards when drafting § 1981a(b) (1). 41
 Giving effect to Con-
gress's expressed intent, the court held that Title VII punitive damages
may be awarded only when the discriminatory conduct is "willful or
egregious" or displays "reckless indifference to the plaintiff's federal
righ ts. "I48
Similarly, in 1998, in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n ("Kolstad f)
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
sitting en bane, held that a complaining party must establish egregious-
ness, in addition to proving intentional employment discrimination,
support punitive damages eau be Mimed from inieutional unlawful discrioninaiion); Kim, 123
F.3d at 1065-66 (recovery of inutitive damages under "Ville VII does not require a heightened
showing beymid in tiomtl discrimination); Luciano, 110 F.3d at 220 (holding that the standard
for punitive damages tinder § 1981a does not require conduct that is "extraordinarily egregious");
Merriwealleer, 103 F.3d at 581 (finding that proof of intention-al discrimination may he sufficient
to ass.attl punitive damages).
141
 See Ngo. 140 F.3d at 1304.
142 See id. at 1300-01.
CI Sty id.
144 See id. at 1301.
145 See
' 46 See Nir,o, 140 FN at 1302-03; see also Smith, 461 U.S. 30, 51-52 (1983); Rowlett v.
Anhettser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 205-07 (1st Cir. 1987); Beauford v. Sisters of Mercy-province
of Detroit, Inc., 816 R2d . 1104, 1109 (6th Cir. 1986).
L 47 See Ngo, 140 F.3d at 1303-04 (citing to H.R. REP. No. 91-40 pt. I, at 72 (1991) and 137
CoNe.. REC. 515,472 (Oct. 30, 1901)).
tilt See Ng). 140 F.3d at 1304.
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for § 1981a(b) (1) punitive damages. 149 In Kolstad I, a female attorney
brought a Title VII action against her employer, the American Dental
Association (the "Association"), for unlawful employment discrimina-
tion when the Association failed to promote her to a chief lobbying
position in its Washington office.'" The plaintiff contended that the
Association picked another male candidate before the formal selection
process, and that the artificial quality of the selection process demon-
strated an intent to engage in sex discrimination.'`'' While the jury
found that the Association had unlawfully discriminated against the
plaintiff on the basis of sex, the district judge declined to allow the jury
to consider punitive damages. 152
In affirming the district judge's finding that punitive damages
were not available to the plaintiff, the sharply-divided court explained
that allowing aggrieved parties to recover punitive damages after only
proving intentional discrimination conflicts with § 1981a's remedial
structure, its legislative history and the Supreme Court's holding in
Smith.'" First, the court stated that § 1981a's structure—one standard
for liability, another for the remedy of punitive damages—strongly
suggests that, before the question of punitive damages can go to the
jury, the complaining party must demonstrate that the employer en-
gaged in conduct more egregious than the conduct necessary to prove
intentional discrimination.'" Although the court noted that
§ 1981a(b)(1)'s plain language is ambiguous and that it is difficult to
give content to the words "malice" or "reckless indifference," the in-
clusion of a separate punitive damages provision indicates that "some-
thing more" is required for Title VII punitive damages as compared to
compensatory damages. 155
In addition to examining the statute's structure, the court also
pointed to legislative history to show that Title VII punitive damages
are only available where egregious conduct is demonstrated.'" Relying
on House Report 40(1) and statements in the Congressional Record, the
court noted that Congress seemed to recognize a higher standard for
awarding punitive damages in Title VII cases.'" The court acknow-
1-35 See 139 F.3d. at 951.
150
 See supra notes 12-21 aid accompanying text.
Iril See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 2-21 and accompat tying text.
155 See &Mad I, 139 1:,!51 at 952,
151 See id, at 901.
in See id. at 951-412.
156 See id. at 9112.
157 See id.; see also 11.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. I, at 72 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, WO; 137 CONC.. Rm. S15,473 (Oct. 30, 1991) (statement by Sen. Dole).
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'edged, however, that legislative history was not definitive and that
some statements in House Report 40 actually supported the view that
§ 1981 a punitive damages do not require a showing of egregious con-
duct.' 58 For example, House Report 40(I) states that punitive damages
under • § 1981 a(b) (1) would be the same as punitive damages under
§ 1981.' 59
 The court viewed this language as ambiguous because,
whereas some courts have held that egregious conduct is required for
§ 1981 punitive damages, other courts have held that a finding of
intentional discrimination, without more, is enough. 16°
The court found determinative, however, the legislative history's
references that § 1981a(b)(1)'s punitive damages standard was taken
directly from civil rights case law.' 61 In particular, the court construed
Smith as establishing an egregious conduct requirement for § 1983
punitive damages.'6' The court noted that, in Smith, compensatory
damages had been assessed on an extremely demanding standard
which incorporated an egregious conduct requirement.'" The court
observed that the punitive damages criterion adopted by the Supreme
Court in Smith was not egregious in relation to the compensatory
standard applied in that particular case. 164 The court reasoned that,
under ordinary circumstances where the compensatory standard is not
as demanding, the punitive damages standard in Smith would require
a showing of egregious conduct.'" Thus, the Court determined that
Smith supports the idea that Title VII punitive damages awards require
egregious conduct. 166 Therefore, based upon § 1981a (b) (1) 's struc-
ture, its legislative history and the court's reading of Smith, the D.C.
Circuit held that Title VII punitive damages may be awarded only on
a showing of egregious conduct. 167
168 See Kolstad /, 139 F.3d at 962-03. For example, House Report 40 (I) stales that punitive
damages tinder § 1981a (b)(1) would be the same as punitive damages under § 1981. See id. at
962; H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. I, at 74 (1091), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,612. The court
viewed this lan guage as ambiguous because, while some courts have held that egregious conduct
is required for § 1081 punitive damages, other courts have held that a finding or intentional
discrimination, without more, is enough to award § 1981 punitive damages. See KoBind 1,139
F.3d at 963.
159 See id. at' 62; H.R. REP. Nu. 102-10 pt. I, at 74 (1991), re/.n 	 in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
012.
166 See Kolstad 1, 139 F.3d at 963.




165 See Kolstad 1, 139 F.3d at 964.
166 See id.: but see Nip, 140 F.3d at 1302-03 (noting that Smith did not require egregious
conduct for § 1983 punitive damages awards).
167 See Kolstad 1, 139 F.3d at 960.
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In a concurring opinion, Judge Randolph recognized § 1981a's
difficult interpretive problems, noting that "malice" and "reckless in-
difference" have different meanings depending on whether the words
are used in the civil or criminal context) 68 The judge reasoned, how-
ever, that the structure of § 1981, notably its two provisions that deal
with compensatory and punitive damages separately, implies that Con-
gress was establishing a two-tier damages system." 19 The judge con-
cluded that the structure of § 1981a, the historical materials and the
purpose of punitive damages indicate that punitive damages should he
awarded only under egregious circumstances.' 7')
Five judges disagreed with the majority's view that the awarding
of Title VII puilitive damages requires a showing of egregiousness. The
dissent argued that the majority's reasoning conflicts with the statute's
plain language and contravenes the Supreme Court's decision in
Smith. 171 The dissent noted that the statutory phrase "reckless indiffer-
ence" refers to the wrongdoer's knowledge that their conduct is wrong-
ful. 172 The dissent reasoned that punitive damages should he awarded
where "the employer either knew of Title VII's prohibitions and acted
regardless or disregarded a substantial risk of violating the statute."'"
Therefore, the dissent concluded that the plain language of the statute
does not require a showing of egregious conduct for Title VII punitive
damages.I 74
The dissent also explained that the egregious conduct require-
ment was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Smith.' 75
The dissent viewed Smith as rejecting the proposition that the thresh-
old for punitive damages should always he higher than that for liabil-
1 "..See id. at 970 (Randolph, J., concurring), Terms such as "recklessness," "reckless disre-
gard," and "reckless indifference," are among the most malleable mid ambiguous in the late',
encompass different meanings and define Varying conduct. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 836-37 (1994); United Slates v. Kiizek, III F.3d 934, 930-41 (1).C. Cir. 1997); Saba v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d (164, 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 190(1). hi civil law, a person is
reckless if he or she acts or fails lo act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is
either known or so obvious that it should be known. Sear Farmer, 511 U.S. at •836-37; See also
PRuSSER & REF.TON, supra note 48, ti 34; RESTATEMENT (SEC,OND) OP "DWI'S § 500 & ant. a (1065).
In criiiiinal law, a per .son is reckless only when he or site disregards a risk of harin of which he
or she is aware. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830-37; MODEL PENAL. CODE § 2.02(2)(c) ft.i. Ont. 3 (1085).
103 See Nolsiad I, 139 F.3d at 970 (Randolph, J., concurring).
1 " See id.
171 See id. at 979 (Told, J., dissenting).
172 See id. at 971.
1 73 See id.
171 See Kolstral 1, 139 F.3d at 971.
170 See id. at 972.
1292	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 40:1269
ity. 176 Instead, the dissent stated that the threshold for punitive damages
need not he higher than that for compensatory liability.'"
Finally, the dissent recognized that even though juries could con-
sider punitive damages on the basis of nothing more than reckless
indifference to the federally-protected rights of the aggrieved party,
juries will not necessarily award punitive damages in every Title VII
case.' 78 Because determining liability and awarding punitive damages
require distinct inquiries, juries may find that the circumstances of the
case may not warrant punitive datnages.' 79 Therefore, the dissent would
have allowed the jury in Kolstad I to determine, based on the standard
of malice or reckless indifference to plaintiff's rights, whether punitive
damages were appropriate because the plaintiff had proven the thresh-
old requirement of intentional disciimination.' 8°
Whereas the Ngo and Kolstad /courts concluded that an aggrieved
party must prove egregious conduct for a Title VII punitive damages
award, in 1997 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that proof of egregious conduct is not necessary in Lu-
ciano v. Olsten Corp.' 8 ' The court, relying mainly on the statute's plain
language, noted that nothing in the statute's text indicated that a
heightened standard was meant to apply to Title VII cases.' 82 Moreover,
the court explained that statements in the Congressional Record and by
President Bush were inconsistent with the statute's plain language
because the statute "tracks the language of existing civil rights laws that
do not require such a showing [of egregiousness] . "183 The House Com-
mittee reports also indicate that § 1981a(b) (1) incorporated the puni-
tive damages standard of other civil lights laws (that of mere reckless
indifference and malice, as opposed to extraordinarily egregious con-
duct) . 184 Thus, the court held that a plaintiff does not have to make an
176 See id. at 972 (Tate], J., dissenting).
177 See id. The dissent noted that this view was adopted by the Supreme Court for liquidated
damages tinder the ADEA in !lawn Paper Co. n Biggins, where the Court interpreted the AREA
to provide for liquidated damages where the violation was **willful," and once a willful violation
was shown, the employee neell not additionally demonstrate that the employer's conduct was
outrageous, See id. at 972-73 (Tatel, J., dissenting); see also Hazen Paper Co. a. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604,615-16 (1993).
im See Kolsiad I, 130 F.3d at 973 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
179 See id. The dissent provided the example of employers who have done everything possible
to comply with the law, and yet, were found to violate Title VII. See id. at 970. While these
employers were found to have committed unlawful intentional discrimination, they were not
recklessly indifferent to their legal obligations. See id.
' 80 See id. at 979 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
tat See Luciano, 110 F.3d at 220; Ago, 140 F.3d at 1304-05; Kolstad I, 139 F.3d at 9(19.
182 se„
186 See id.
18 ' See Id.
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additional showing of egregious conduct, beyond the proof of reckless
indifference, to obtain punitive damages under § 1981a(b) (1). 185
Similarly, in 1997, in Adahai v. Front Row Seat, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a showing of
egregious conduct is not necessary in awarding punitive damages un-
der § 1981a(b) (1). 186 In Adakal, a video rental store employee sued his
employer for discrimination based on his Native American race. 187 The
plaintiff alleged that he was fired two-and-one-half weeks after being
hired because he was a Native American and, in particular, because he
adhered to his heritage of keeping his hair long. 188
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury's award for punitive damages
under § 1981a(b) (1). 189 The court stated that, in awarding punitive
damages, the employer's conduct need not have been "extraordinarily
egregious" to support a finding of punitive damages. 15° The court
implicitly reasoned that the absence of statutory language indicating
that Congress imposed an egregious conduct requirement on Title V11
punitive damages demonstrates that the defendant's conduct need not
-be "extraordinarily egregious" to support a punitive damages award. 19 '
The court asserted that the conduct required to support punitive
damages can be inferred from the participation of management in the
discriminatory acts. 192 Thus, the court affirmed the punitive damages
awarded to plaintiff and held that the plaintiff's evidence supporting
his intentional discrimination claim was sufficient to demonstrate ► al-
ice or reckless indifference to plaintiff's federally protected right to be
free of discriminatory practices.'"
These cases illustrate that the circuit courts were split regarding
the appropriate standard for awarding punitive damages under Title
V11. 14 Whereas some circuits have held that a complaining party must
. meet the threshold requirement of egregious conduct to be entitled
to punitive damages, other circuits have held that a complaining party
185 See irl.
' '' See Adakai, 1997 wl. 003458, at *2.
le See id. at *1.
188 See id.
18" See id. at *3.
194 See id. al *2.
191 See Adahai, 1997 WL 603453, al *2.
1.92 See
 id,
191 See id. at *3.
19-I See Ngo, 140 F.3(1 at 1304-05; Kash, 1, 139 F.3(1 al 969; Adahai, 1997 WL 603458, at *2;
Luciano, 110 F.3cl at 220.
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may be awarded punitive damages upon a lesser showing of only
intentional discrimination."'
N. KOLSTAD HAND THE SUPREME COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF § I981A(B)(1)
In 1999, in KoLstad v. Antillean Dental Ass'n ("Kolstad II"), the
Supreme Court of the United States addressed the circumstances un-
der which Title VII punitive damages may be awarded."' The Court
held an employer's conduct need not be egregious to satisfy § 1981a's
punitive damages requirements, although evidence of egregious mis-
conduct may be used to meet the plaintiff's burden of proof. 197 Rather,
the proper inquiry in awarding Title VII punitive damages is the
employer's state of mind—whether there was a perceived risk that their
actions would violate federal law.' 98
In vacating the D.C. Circuit's en bane opinion, the Court first
observed that § 1981a established a two-tier structure for awarding
Title VII damages. 199 The Court stated that the structure of § 1981a
suggests a congressional intent to authorize punitive damages in only
a subset of cases involving unlawful intentional discrimination.m
Thus, the Court reasoned that Congress clearly sought to impose
two standards for liability: one standard for receiving compensatory
damages, and a second, higher standard for receiving punitive dam-
ages."'
The Court determined that the appropriate inquiry in awarding
Title VII punitive damages focuses 011 the employer's state of mind,
not the nature of their conduct. 2" The Court noted that the language
used in § 1981 a(b) (1) —notably the terms !`malice" and "reckless indif-
ference"—requires courts to impose Title VII punitive damages based
on the actor's subjective mental state." Because "malice" and "reckless
indifference" pertain to . the employer's knowledge that it may be acting
in violation of federal law, the Court observed that proof of egregious
conduct independent of the employer's mental state cannot support a
punitive damages award. 2"
195 See supra note 138 awl accottipat tying text.
196 See 119 S. Ct. 21 IS, 2121 (1999) ("Krdstad It).
Jo See id. at 2129.
198 See id. at 2125.
199 See id. at 2124.
2°O See id. ,
20
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To give meaning to the terms "malice" and "reckless indifference,"
the Supreme Court turned to its decision in Smith. 205 The Court ob-
served that, under Smith, punitive damages require "recklessness in its
subjective form."2N Moreover, the Court noted that the Smith Court
referred to a "subjective consciousness" of a risk of injury or illegality
and a "criminal indifference to civil obligations" in establishing the
§ 1983 punitive damages standard. 207 Applying this rationale, the Court
stated that to obtain Title VII punitive damages, the plaintiff must show
that an employer has discriminated in the face of a perceived risk that
its actions will violate federal law. 2°8
The Court also noted that, although Title VII punitive damages
may be awarded based on the employer's mental state, egregious con-
duct may serve as evidence .supporting an inference of an employer's
"malice" or "reckless indifference." 2° Because "malice" and "reckless
indifference" are associated with egregious misconduct, the Court rea-
soned that evidence of egregious acts may serve to establish the requi-
site state of mind to obtain punitive damages. 21° Therefore, the Su-
preme Court in Kolstad II held that an employer's conduct need not
be independently egregious to satisfy § 1981a's punitive damages re-
quirements, although evidence of egregious misconduct may be used
to establish the requisite mental state. 2 '
V. INTERPRETING § 1981A(B) ( 1 )1 EGREGIOUS CONDUCT AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR TITLE VII PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Although the Supreme Court in Kolstad II determined that the
proper inquiry for awarding Title VII punitive damages is whether the
employer discriminated in the face of a perceived risk of violating
federal law, the principles of statutory construction reveal a congres-
sional intent to award Title VII punitive damages only where employers
2°.".4.irr id. at 2124-25.
296 See Kolstad II, 110 S. Ct. at 2125.
2° 7 Id. at 2125 (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 37 n.6, 41 (1985)).
2°8 See id. at 2125.
2(".1 See id. at 2126.
2iri see Id.
211
	 Kolstad II, 119 S. Ct. at 2129, In Kolsiad	 the Supreme Court also held Mat, in the
punitive damages context, all employer may Clot he vicariously liable for the discriminatoly
employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the enployer's
good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII. See id, The Court reasoned that giving punitive
damages protection to employers who make good-faith eflbrts to prevent workplace discrimina-
tion accomplishes Title VIPs objective of motivating employers to detect and deter Title VII
violations. See id.
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engage in egregious misconduct. 212 Thus, whereas the Supreme Court's
decision in Kolstad II requires courts to focus on the mental state of
the employer in awarding Title VII punitive damages, Congress in-
tended to award punitive damages based upon the severity of the
em ployer's misconduct.21 This egregious conduct requirement would
reserve punitive .damages only for the worst cases of intentional Ells-
crimination. 214
In determining under what circumstances punitive damages may
be awarded under Title VII for unlawful intentional discrimination,
courts should operate under the well-established principles of statutory
construction designed to assist in ascertaining and giving effect to
Congress's intent. 215
 Courts should begin with § 1981a's language, and
if the language is plain and unambiguous, courts must give effect to
Congress's expressed intent. 21" If § 1981a's language is ambiguous,
however, courts should review the statute's legislative history, its struc-
ture, the circumstances sin-rounding its enactment and its purpose for
interpretive guidance.217
 Thus, in interpreting § 1981a(b)(1), the
courts' primary goal should be to determine and give effect to Con-
gress's intent. 218
Despite the Kolstad II Court's rationale, based upon these tenets
of statutory interpretation, Congress intended punitive damages to be
awarded only in cases of egregious misconduct. 21 Although the stat-
ute's language is ambiguous and provides little guidance in ascertain-
ing Congress's intent, its legislative history, its structure and the cir-
cumstances surrounding its enactment establish a congressional intent
to impose punitive damages only in egregious circumstances. 22°
212 See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2125 (1999) ("Kolstad II"); see also
infra notes 224-95 and accompanying text.
213 See infra notes 225-06 and accompanying text.
211 See Kolstad A 119 S. Ca. at 2130 (Rehnquist, C.j., dissenting).
215 See Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Connitission on [Inman Rights and
Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 356-57 (Conn. 11187); see also Beertnatin, supra note 59, at 51-54.
216 See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993); Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. American
Train Dispatchers' Ass'it, 490 U.S. 117, 128 (1991); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.
564, 570.(1982).
2" SeeCntmlon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); Rector, Etc., of Holy Trinity Church
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457. 459 (1892); Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d at 356-57; see also Smith
v. wade, 461 U.S. 30. 34 (1983); Griffin,  458 U.S. at 571.
218 Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 104; Norfolk & Western 	 Co., 499 U.S. at 128; Quinnipiac Con nell.
528 A.2c1 at 356-57.
219 See 137 CONG. REC. S15„473 (Oct. 30, 1991) (Interpretive Memo of Sen. Dole); see also
Kolstad II, 119 S. Ct. at 2124-25.
22°See 42 U.S.G. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994); Kolstad V. American Dental Ass'it, 139 F.31 958,
962-63 (D.C. Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2130 (1999) ("Kolstad I"); FI.R. REP. No.
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A. The Language of § 1981a(b)(1)
The language of § 1981a(b) (1) is ambiguous and provides little
help in determining the circumstances under which Congress in-
tended Title VII punitive damages to be awarded."' Because
§ 1981a(b) (1) uses the terms "Malice" and "reckless indifference,"
which are fraught with ambiguity; it is difficult to ascertain Congress's
intent in awarding Title VII punitive damages from the statute's plain
language. 222 The D.C. Circuit in Kolstad /recognized Congress's. impre-
cise language and observed that § 1981a(b) (1)'s language hardly pin-
points what the content of the punitive damages standard ought to
be . 22S
In determining the appropriate standard for Title VII punitive
damages, courts have attempted to interpret the statute's plain lan-
guage and, in particular, the common law meaning of "malice" and
"reckless indifference. "224 For example, the Supreme Court in Kolstad
Himplied that the statute's plain language is clear and unambiguous. 225
There, the Court stated that the terms "malice" and "reckless indiffer-
ence" ultimately focus on the actor's state of mind. 226 Relying on its
decision in Smith, the Court reasoned that, because these terms his-
torically pertain to an actor's knowledge that it may be violating the
law, Congress intended to award Title VII punitive damages under
similar circumstances—where an employer discriminates in the face of
a perceived risk that its actions will violate Title VII. 227
As judge Randolph's concurring opinion in Kolstad /recognized,
however, the difficulty with the language of § 1981a(b) (1) is that the
102-40(I), at 64-65, 72 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 602-03, 610; 137 CoNG. REC.
515,483 (Oct. 30, 1991) (Sponsors' Interpretive Memoranditin); 137 CONG. REC. S15,473 (Oct.
30, 1991) (Interpretive Memorandum of Sen. Dole); 137 CONG. REC. 41952G (Nov. 7, 1991)
(Interpretive Memorandum of Rep. Edwards); 137 CONG. REC. 149543 (Nov, 7, 1991) (statements
of Rep. Hyde).
221 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1994);
Smith, 461 U.S. at 37 11.6, 39 11,8; Kolstad I, 139 F.3d at 962; United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934,
939-41 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fiance, 78 F.3d 664, 668-69 (D.C. Cir.
1996); PROSSER & KEETON, SUM note 48, §§ 2, 8, 31, 34; but see I,ueiano, 110 F.3d at 220 (court
noted that nothing in till; statute's plain language indicates a heightened standard lot Tide VII
punitive damages).
222 See sigma note 220.
22:1 See Kolstad I, 139 F.3d at 961.
221 See Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
dismissed, 119 S. Ct. 2015 (1999); Kolstad I, 139 F.3d at 961-62; id. at 971-72 (Patel, J., dissenting);
Luciano, 110 F.3d at 220.
225 See Kolstad II, 119 S., Ct. at 2124-25.
226 See N.
227 See id, at 2126 (citing to Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)).
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terms "malice" and "reckless indifference" encompass a broad range
of meanings, resulting in imprecision and inconsistent application. 228
For example, the Smith Court refused to adopt a punitive damages
standard under § 1983 that incorporated the term "malice" because it
was "a hopelessly versatile and ambiguous term, carrying a broad
spectrum of meanings."229
 Moreover, terms like "recklessness;" "reck-
less disregard" and "reckless indifference," are among the most malle-
able and ambiguous in the law, encompass different meanings and
define varying conduct."°For example, in civil law, a person is reckless
if he or she acts or fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk
of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.23 i
In criminal law, however, a person is reckless only when he or she
disregards a risk of harm of which he or she is aware. 2 ;2 Because
§ 1981a(b) (I)'s plain language does not indicate whether Congress
intended to adopt the civil or the criminal law definition of reckless-
ness, the meaning of the term as used in § 1981a(b) (1) is unclear."'
Despite this ambiguity, some federal courts have reasoned that the
statute's plain language does indicate Congress's intent not to impose
an egregious conduct requirement on Title 'VII punitive damages."' In
Luciano, for example, the Second Circuit stated that nothing in the
statute's text or plain language indicates that a heightened punitive
damages standard was meant to apply in Title VII cases."' The court
reasoned that, because the statute does not explicitly mention "egre-
giousness" or "heightened scrutiny," the statute's plain language indi-
cates that nothing more than proof of unlawful intentional discrimi-
nation is required for punitive damages.239
 Similarly, in Adakai, the
Tenth Circuit implicitly reasoned that the absence of language indicat-
2" See. Kolstad I, 139 F.3d at 970 (Randolph, J., concurring); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at
836-37; Smith, 461 U.S. at '37 ri.6, 39 11.8; Ka/start, 139 F.3d al 962; Krizek, 111 F.34 at 930-41;
Saba, 78 F.3d at 668-69; PROSSER & KEETON, MOM note 48, §§ 2 11.24, 8, 30, 34.
229 See Smith, 461 U.S. at 37 ti.6, 39 11.8.
2" See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37; Kolstad I, 139 F.341 at 962; Krizek, Ill F.3d at 939-41; Saba,
78 F.3{1 at 668-69.
231 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37; see also PROSSER KEETON, supra note 48, § 34; REsTATE-
MEM- (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 & can. a (1965).
232 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37; MODEL. PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) & cum, 3 (1985).
233 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1) (1994); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37; MonEt. PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(c) & cult. 3 (1985); PROSSER & KF:EFON, supra note 48, § 34; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 500 & out. a (1965).
234 See Luciano, 110 F.3d at 220; see also Kolstad I, 139 F.3d at 971 (Thiel, J., dissenting); Makai
v. Front Row Seat, No. 96-2249, 1997 WL 603458, at *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 1997); Nash
Finch Co„ 123 F.3d 1046, 1065-66 (8th Cir. 1997).
235 See 110 F',3d at 220.
236
 See id. .
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ing that Congress imposed an egregious conduct requirement on Title
VII punitive damages demonstrates that the defendant's conduct need
not be "extraordinarily egregious" to support a punitive damages
award. 237
The difficulty with the Luciano and Adaltai courts' reasoning,
however, is that the absence of statutory language does not necessarily
indicate an absence of congressio4 intent. 2"8 For example, while
§ 1981's and § 1983's plain language is silent' on the issue of punitive
damages, courts have determined that Congress intended punitive
damages to be a remedy for violation of these statutes. 239 Therefore,
the absence of language in § 1981a (b) (1) indicating that punitive
damages are to be awarded only in egregious circumstances is not
determinate on whether Congress intended such a heightened Title
VII punitive damages standard. 24°
Thus, it is difficult to give effect to Congress's intent by examining
§ 1981a(b) (1)'s plain language. 241 Because Congress used ambiguous
terms—"malice" and "reckless indifference"—to define the conduct
warranting Title VII punitive damages, the circumstances under which
it intended to award punitive damages are unclear." 2 As a result,
guidance from the § 1981a's legislative history, the circumstances sur-
rounding its enactment, § 1981a's structure and the statute's purpose
are necessary to discern Congress's intent. 243
B. Legislative History of § 1981a(b)(1)
The 1991 Act's legislative history provides strong evidence 'that
' Congress intended punitive damages to be awarded only under circum-
237 See Adakai, 1997 Wt. 603458, at *2.
2" See. e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247. 253, 255 (1978) (punitive damages are a reined)'
under § 1983 CVC1 I though the statute's plain language and legislative history arc .silent oil the
issue).
255 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1994); Smith, 461 U.S. at 34 (recognizing punitive damages
as a remedy mulct . § 1983 despite the absence of explicit language in the statute); Carty, 435 U.S.
at 253, 255 (punitive damages are a remedy under § 198'3 even though the statute's plain
language and kgislative history are silent on the issue); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975)(recogniting ptmitive damages as a remedy under § 1981 despite ihe
absence of explicit language in the statute); we also Caperei v. Huurtoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st
Cir. 19(18)• (per curium); Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573, 576-77 (5th Cir. 11167).
2111 See salmi notes 242-43 and acct.unpanying text.
2 ' 11 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994); see also Negonsoil, 507 U.S. at 104; Ctiffin. 458 U.S.
at 570; Quinnipiar Council, 528 A.2d at 356-57.
2-12 See supra notes 225-37 and accompanying ten
243 See Negonsoll, 507 U.S. at 104-05; Griffin, 458 U.S. at 570; Quinnipiar. Counril, 528 A.2d
al 356-57.
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stances of egregious conduct. 2"a The House reports submitted with the
§ 1981a and congressional debate indicate that Title VII punitive clam-
ages require egregious conduct. 245 For example, House Report 40(1)
stated that "[p]laintiffs must first prove intentional discrimination,
then must prove actual injury or loss arising therefrom to recover com-
pensatory damages, and must meet an even higher standard . . . to
recover punitive damages."246 In ;addition, according to the Sponsors'
Interpretive Memorandum submitted into the Congressional Record,
victims of unlawful intentional discrimination "are entitled not only to
equitable relief, but also to compensatory damages. Further, in egre-
gious cases, punitive damages may also be awarded." 247 Representative
Hyde also remarked that punitive damages "are to be awarded only in
extraordinarily egregious cases." 248 Finally, Senator Dole introduced all
interpretive memorandum which stated that "[Ounitive damages are
also capped, and are to be awarded only in extraordinarily egregious
cases."249 Therefore, statements made in the House reports and con-
gressional debate demonstrate that Congress intended to award Title
VII punitive damages only under egregious circumstances. 25°
Advocates of the contrary opinion-that Congress did not intend
an egregious conduct requirement-argue that § 1981a's legislative
history support their position. 25 ' For example, in Kolstad II, the Su-
preme Court stated that, because § 1981a's legislative history indicates
that Congress relied on Smith in formulating Title V1I's punitive dam-
211 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (I) (1994); Kolstad I, 139 F.Ild at 962-63; H.R. REP. No. 102-40
pt. I, at 72 (1991), reptinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 610; 137 CONG. Rec. 515,483 (Oct. 30,
1991) (Sponsors' Interpretive Memorandum); 137 CoNG. REC. 515,473 (Oct. 30, 1991) (litter-
'tredve Idenioranclum of Sen. Dole); 137 CONG. REC. 1 -19543 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statements of Rep.
Hyde); see also Ngo, 140 F.3d at 1303.
249 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. I, at 65, 72, 74 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
603, 610, 612; H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. 11, at 28-20 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,
721-23; 137 CONG. REG. 119543 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statements of Rep. Hyde); 137 CoNG. REc. S15,483
(Oct. 30, 1991) (Sponsors' Inierpretive Memorandum); 137 CONG. REC. 515,473 (Oct. 30, 199I)
(Interpretive Memorandum of Sen. Dole).
246 11.R. REP. No, 102-40 pi. I, at 72 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 610.
247 137 CoNG. REG. S15,483 (Oct. 30, 1991) (Sponsors' Interpretive Nlentorandunt).
218 137 CONG. REC. 119543 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statements of Rep. Hyde).
219 137 CONG. REG. 515,473 (Oct. 30, 1991) (Interpretive Memorandum of Sen. Dole).
299 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. I, at 72 (1991); repinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 610; 137
CONG. REc.. 515483 (Oct. 30, 1991) (Sponsors' Interpretive Memorandum); 137 CoNG. REC.
S15,473 (Oct. 30, 1991) (Interpretive Memorandum of Sen. Dole); 137 CONG. REC. 149543 (Nov.
7, 1901) (statements of' Rep. Hyde).
25 I See &Riad 1, 130 F.3(1 at 974 (Thiel, J., dissenting); Luciano, 110 F.3d at 220: see also H.R.
REP. No. 102-40 pt. 1, at 74 (1990,, repiiiited itt 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 612;11.R. REP. No. 102-40
pt. 11. at 29 (1991), reptinied in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 722; 137 CoNG. REG. 119527 (Nov. 7, 1991)
(Interpretive Memorandum of Rep. Edwards).
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ages standard, Congress intended to award punitive damages only
where the employer discriminated in the face of a perceived risk that
its actions violated federal law. 2 ' 2 Thus, according to the Supreme
Court in Kolstad II, the employer's conduct does not have to be "inde-
pendently egregious" to satisfy § 1981a's punitive damages require-
ments.235
Likewise, in Luciano, the Second Circuit stated that, because Con-
gress intended to award Title VII punitive damages under the same
circumstances as § 1981 punitive damages, Congress did not desire to
impose an egregious conduct requirement on Title VII pUnitive dam-
ages. 254 Referring to House Report 40(II) and statements made by
Representative Edwards in the Congressional Record, the Luciano court
observed that Congress intended Title VII punitive damages to be
available to the same extent as they are available under § 1981. 255 The
Luciano court reasoned that any difference between the Title VII pu-
nitive damages standard and the § 1981 punitive damages standard
"would contravene, Congress's express purpose of equalizing the reme-
dies available for race and other forms of discrimination."2 m n
Although § 1981a(b) (1) 's legislative history demonstrates Con-
gress's intent to adopt the § 1981 and § 1983 punitive damages stand-
ards, Congress still' could have intended complaining parties to recover
Title VII punitive damages only under egregious circmnstances. 257 In
Smith, the Supreme Court held that the threshold for § 1983 punitive
damages need not be higher than that for compensatory liability. 258 In
short, the Smith Conti clearly rejected an egregious conduct require-
ment for § 1983 punitive damages. 2r" The Ngo court correctly observed,
however, that many courts have misapplied the Smith standard in the
years between Smith and § 1981a's enactment by requiring egregious
conduct for punitive damages in civil rights case law. 26° Thus, while
252 See Koirstad 11,119 S. CI. at 2124-25.
255 See id. at 2129.
251 See Luciano, 110 F.3d at 220; see also Kagan' I, 139 F.3d at 971,075 (Mitch J., dissenting).
25 See Luciano, 110 F.3(.1 at 220; H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), at 24 (1991), re/minted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 094, 717; 137 CoNc.. REC.. 119527 (Nov. 7, 1991) (Interpretive Mentor:00nm of Rep.
Edwards).
2'41 See Luciano, 110 F.3d at 220; see also 1-1.R. Rio'. No. 102-40 pt. 1, at 05 (1991), irininled in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,603.
257 See Ngo, 140 F.3d at 1301-03; sec also H.R. REP, No. 102-40 pi. I, at 74 (1991), crirrinled
in 1091 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,612.
258 See Smith, 462 U.S. at 53.
25" See id.
260 See Ngo, 140 F.3d at 1302-03; see also Smini, 462 U.S. at 53; Jackson v. Pool Mortgage Co.,
808 F.2d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 1989); Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484,
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some courts, like the First Circuit in Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
adopted the correct reading of Smith that the threshold for punitive
damages need not be higher than that for compensatory liability, other
federal courts, such as the Sixth Circuit in Beauford v. Sisters of Mercy-
Province of Detroit, Inc., misapplied the Smith standard and required
egregious conduct for § 1981 punitive damages. 26 ' Because courts mis-
applied the Smith standard by imposing an egregious conduct require-
ment for § 1981 punitive damages, it is unclear what Congress meant
when it stated that the Title VII punitive damages standard was the
same as the § 1981 punitive damages standard. 262 Did Congress in-
tend to incorporate Rowlett's rationale that the threshold for punitive
damages need not be higher than that for compensatory liability, or
did Congress intend to incorporate the heightened "egregious[ness]"
standard articulated by the Beauford court that misapplied Smith? 2"
The references in § 1981a's legislative history that Congress intended
to award Title VII punitive damages under the same circumstances as
§§ 1981 and 1983 punitive damages . are, by themselves, ambiguous
because, in the years leading up to § 1981a's enactment, federal courts
applied different punitive damages standards under § 1981. 264
Despite this ambiguity, § 1981a's 'legislative history indicates that
Congress intended to adopt the misapplied Smith standard when it
incorporated § 1981a's punitive damages standard "directly from civil
rights case law."265
 While both House Reports 40(1) and 40(10 recog-
nize that the Title VII punitive damages standard would be the same
as the § 1981 punitive damages standard, House Report 40(I) observed
that: Iv] ictims of intentional race discrimination are entitled under
42 U.S.C. section 1981 not only to equitable relief, but also compensa-
tory damages, and in particular egregious cases, punitive damages as
well.'K6
 According to this passage, the House Committee on Education
489-90 (4th Cir. 1988); Beauford v. Sisters of Mercy-Province of Detroit, Inc., 816 F.2d 1104,
1108-09 (6I6 Cir. 1987); LValters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135, 1146-48 (1116 Cir. 1980).
261 See supra notes 82-104 and accompanying text.
262 See Vgt), 140 F.3(1 at 1302-03; Bamford, 816 F.2(1 at 1109; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40
pt. I, at 74 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 612; H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. II, at 29
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 722; 137 CONG. Ry.c. 119527 (Nov. 7, 1991) (Interpre-
tive Memorandum of Rep. Edwards).
263 See Ngo, 140 F.3d at 13(13.
2&l See supra note 248-67 and accompanying text.
265 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. 11, at 29 (1991), relninted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 722; see
also Ngo, 140 F.11 at 1303-04; FI,R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. I, at 65 (1991), reprinted in 1091
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603.
266 II.R. REP. No. 102-40 pi. I, at 65, 74 (1991), repritatyl in 1091 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603, 612;
see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. II, at 25 (1991), 104 nial in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 718.
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and Labor understood that punitive damages under § 1981 were
awarded only in particularly egregious cases—the standard adopted by
the Beauford court and other courts that misapplied the Smith ration-
ale. 2 " 7 Therefore, according to House Report 40(I), Congress under-
stood existing civil rights case law as requiring egregious conduct for
a punitive damages award, even though the circuit courts were split on
whether egregious conduct was necessary for § 1981 punitive dam-
ages. 268
Therefore, the legislative history demonstrates Congress's intent
to award Title VII punitive damages only in egregious circmnstances. 269
Although there are references in the House reports that Congress
intended Title VII punitive damages to be awarded under the same
circumstances as other civil rights statutes, Congress understood
§ 1981 as awarding punitive damages only under egregious circuan-
stances, 27°
C. Circumstances Surrounding the Enactment of the 1991 Act
The circumstances surrounding the passage of the 1991 Act pro-
vide strong evidence that Congress intended to award punitive dam-
ages only under egregious circumstances. 271 One of Congress's major
concerns in enacting § 1981a was that, by expanding the availability of
Title VII remedies to include compensatory and punitive damages,
employees would have a greater incentive to litigate and pursue frivo-
lous lawsuits. 272 Employers feared that the costs of defending Title VII
267 Sir H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. I, at 65.74 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603,
612; H,R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. 11, at 25 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 718; see also
Beanfird, 816 F.2d at 1109. In addition, in House Report 40(11), the Commidee on the judiciary
stated that "[Section] 1981 authorizes court to award to victims of intentional discriminatioit in
contracts not only equitable relief, but also compensatory damages, and in appropriate circum-
stances, intuitive damages as lyell." H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. II, at 25 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 718-19.
26-9 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. I, at 65 (1091), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603; see
also Ng°, 140 F.3(.1 at 1302-04.
265 See supra notes 248-72 and accompanying text.
27° See supra notes 248-72 and accompanying text.
271 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. I, at 142-43 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
671-72; 137 CONG. REC. 1 -19525 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statement by Rep. Brooks); 137 CONG. REC.. 1 - 19542
(Nov. 7, 1991) (statements by Rep. Hyde); 137 CONG. REC.. 119543 (Nov. 7, 1991) (Interpretive
Memorandum of Rep. Hyde); 137 CONG. REC.. 515,276 (Oct. 25, 1991) (statement by Sen.
Danforth); Statement of President George Bush Upon Signing S. 1745, 27 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doc. 1701 (Nov. 25, 1991).
272 See H.R. Rm.. No. 102-40 pt. I, at 70-73, 142-43 (1991), reprinted in 1091 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, 608-611, 671-72; see also 137 CONC.. REC. 119525 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statement by Rep. Brooks);
137 CONG. REc. 119542 (Nov. 7, 1091) (statements by Rep. Hyde); 137 CONG. REC. H9543 (Nov.
1304	 BOSTON COLLEGE L.411' REVIEW	 • [Nbl. 40:1269
lawsuits and the availability of compensatory and punitive damages for
unlawful discrimination would pose severe financial burdens:273 Con-
gress believed that employers would resort to the use of hiring quotas
in response to the 1991 Act to avoid increased litigation costs and
potential Title VII liability. 274
To alleviate the concerns that the 1991 Act would become a "quota
bill," Congress limited the scope of compensatory and punitive damage
by including provisions in the legislation that would remove incentives
for employees to pursue frivolous lawsuits and that would prevent
excessive litigation costs. 275 For example, the 1991 Act capped the sum
of compensatory and punitive damages depending upon the number
of employees working for the employer and made punitive damages
available only in disparate treatment cases.276 Thus, although Congress
expanded Title VII remedies to include compensatory and punitive
damages, it limited the scope of these remedies to provide incentives
for complaining parties to pursue only meritorious claims and to pre-
clude unnecessary litigation costs incurred by entployers. 277
With this in mind, interpreting § 1981a(b)(1) as awarding Title
VII punitive damages only under egregious circumstances is consistent
with Congress's desire to prevent excessive litigation costs incurred by
employers. 278 For example, § 1981a's legislative history discusses Con-
gress's belief that a higher burden on complaining parties to recover
punitive damages would prevent frivolous lawsuits. 279 In House Report
40(I), the Committee on Education and Labor stated:
W here is also no merit to the suggestion that adding a dam-
ages remedy to Title VII will cause juries to award damages
7, 1991) (Interpretive i‘lemorandlini of Rep. Hyde); 137 CONG. REC. S15,343 (Oct. 29, 1991)
(statement by Sen. Danforili); 137 CONG. REG. S15,276 (Oct. 25, 1991) (statement by Sen.
Danforth); Statement of President George Bush Upon Signing S. 1745, 27 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doc. 1701 (Nov. 25, 1991).
273 See 1.1.R. REP. No. 40 pt. I, at 70 (1991). reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 608.
274 See 137 CONG. R.E.c. H9525 (No•. 7, 1991) (statement by Rep. Brooks); 137 CONG. REC. S
15276 (Oct. 25, 1991) (statement by Sen. Danforth).
275 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.. § 1981a(b)(3) (capping the sum of compensatory , and punitive dam-
ages depending 011 the number of employees ivorking for the respondent); see also 137 CONG.
REC. 110525 (No•. 7, 1991) (statement by Rep. Brooks); 137 CONG. Rec. S 15276 (Oct. 25, 1991)
(statemeni by Sen. Danforth).
276 .Yee 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(3).
2" See 1 . 1	 REP. No. 102-40 pt. 1, at 70-72 (1991), ref timer( in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 608-10.
278 See supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (I) (1994);
H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. I, at 72 (1991), repinied in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 610; Kolslad 1 139
F.341 at 961.
279 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pt. I, at 72 (1990. reininled in 1991 U.S.C.G.A.N. 549, 610; see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994); Kolstad 1, 139 F.3c1 at 961.
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vastly disproportionate to the offenses committed by the de-
fendant or the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. Strict stand-
ards limit the recovery of damages by plaintiffs with merito-
rious claims. Plaintiffs must first prove intentional discrim-
ination, then Must prove actual injury or loss arising therefrom
to recover compensatory damages, and must meet an even
higher standard (establishing that the employer acted with
malice or reckless or callous indifference to their rights) to
recover punitive damages. 28"
By awarding punitive damages only in egregious circumstances,
Congress believed that employers would not face disproportional
jury awards, and there would still be incentives for complaining
parties to pursue mediation for settling disputes. 281 Therefore, the
circumstances surrounding the passage of the 1991 Act—including
concerns of disproportional jury awards and unnecessary litigation
expenses—favor an interpretation of § 1981a(b) (1) that imposed
an egregious conduct requirement, reserving punitive damages for
the worst cases of intentiolial discrimination.282
D. The Structure of § 1981
Filially, the structure of § 1981 a also supports the conclusion that
Congress intended to award Title VII punitive damages only under-
egregious circumstances. 2" The Supreme Court in Kolstad II recog-
nized that the structure of § 1981a presents a two-tier damages scheme
for Title VII victims—one for liability and another for the exceptional
remedy of punitive damages. 284 The Kolstad II Court noted § 1981 a's
structure "suggests a congressional intent to authorize punitive awards
in only a subset of cases involving intentional discrimination." 28.5
28° H.R. REP. No. 102-40 pi, 1, at 72 (1991), trprinted in. 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N, 549, 610.
281 See H.R. REP. No. 10210 pt. I, at 72-73 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 610-11.
282 See I4.R. REP. No. 102140 pt. 1, at 142-43 (1991), reirrinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
671-72; 137 Cow.. R.F.c. 119525 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statement by Rep. Brooks); 137 CONG. Rae. 119542
(Nov. 7, 1991) (statements by Rep. Hyde); 137 CoNo. Rae. 119543 (Nov. 7, 1991) (Interpretive
Memorandum of Rep. Hyde); 137 GONG. Rae. S 15,276 (Oct. 25, 1991) (statement by Sen.
Danforth); Statement of President George Bush Upon Signing S. 1745, 27 WEEKLY Co•. ot•
Picas. Doc. 1701 (Nov. 25, 1991),
289
	
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (a) ( I) (1994) (authorizing a victim's right to recover compen-
satory and punitive damages for unlawful intentional discrimination), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b) (1) (describing the circumstances when a victim can recover punitive damages).
284 See 119 S. Ct. at 2124.
285 Id.
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Section 1981a(a) (1) enables a victim to recover compensatory and
punitive damages under Title VII. 286 Although § 1981a does not articu-
late a compensatory damages standard, § 1981a(b) (1) explicitly states
that punitive damages are awarded only if the complaining party meets
the threshold of proving that the respondent engaged in conduct with
"malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual. " 2s7
 The statute's silence on a compensatory dam-
ages standard implies that such a remedy would be available in all cases
of unlawful intentional discrimination. 288
 The inclusion of a section
defining when punitive damages would be available, however, demon-
strates that Congress did not intend punitive damages to be available
in every case of unlawful intentional discrimination: 2w'
The fact that Congress set forth a separate punitive damages
standard implies that there is an egregious conduct requirement that
reserves punitive damages only for the worst cases of intentional dis-
aimination.29° As the D.C. Circuit in Kolstad I observed, "Nile struc-
ture of the statute—one standard for basic liability another for the
exceptional remedy of punitive liability—strongly suggests that, before
the question of punitive damages can go to the jury, the evidence
of the defendant's culpability must exceed what is needed to show
intentional discrimination: 291 Thus, only if aggrieved parties meet the
higher-threshold standard of proof of § 1981a(b) (1) would they then
be entitled to the exceptional remedy of punitive damages:4' 2
CONCLUSION
Since § 1981a's enactment, courts have struggled to determine the
appropriate circumstances to award Title VII punitive damages. This
confusion originated from the varying and inconsistent circumstances
in which courts have awarded §§ 1981 and 1983 punitive damages.
Although Congress explicitly stated that it was adopting § 1981's puni-
tive damages standard for Title VII, Congress failed to articulate what
§ 1981 punitive damages standard it adopted: the correctly-applied Smith
v. Wade standard that allows punitive damages to he assessed under the .
286 See 42 U.S.C.	 1981a(a)(1).
287 See id. § 1981a(a)(1).
28.1i See id.
289 See id.; Koh1ad I, 139 F.3(1 at 901.
299 See Kolstad I, 139 F.3(1 at 961.
291 See id.
292 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (authorizing a victim's right to recover compensatory
and punitive damages for unlawful intentional discrimination), with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)
(describing the circumstances when a victim can recover punitive damages).
•
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same circumstances as compensatory damages, or the misguided Smith
standard that requires egregious conduct for punitive damages awards.
In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n ("Kolstad If'), the Supreme
Court rejected an egregious conduct requirement for Title VII punitive
damages. Rather, the Supreme Court determined that Title VII puni-
tive damages should be awarded based on employers' state of mind,
not the severity of their conduct. Because society has become arguably
more aware of its rights and obligations under federal employment
statutes, the consequences of the Supreme Court's holding in Kolstad
II could be a rise in the number of cases where punitive damages may
be awarded. 2`ts
Despite the Supreme Court's determination, § 1981 a's legislative
history indicates that Congress intended Title VII.punitive damages to
be awarded only under egregious circumstances. Not only do House
reports and congressional debate support this interpretation, but also
§ 1981a's structure suggests a desire by Congress to award this remedy
only in limited situations. This interpretation of § 1981a(b) (1), more-
over, would be consistent with the circumstances surrounding its en-
actment. Thus, under the egregious conduct requirement, punitive
damages would remain an extraordinary remedy reserved for the worst
cases of intentional discrimination.
JASON P. POGORELEC
293 Ahhough tbe Kolstad II Court's interpretation of § 1081;1(11)(1) appears to make it easier
for employees to will punitive damages against their employers, the Supreme Court's decision
may, iu tact, make the remedy more difficult to win. See Kolstad a, American Dental Ass 'a, 110 S.
Ct. 2118, 2129 (1090) ("Kolstad If'). In the second part of the Kaska II decision, the Supreme
Court held that agency principles place limits on au employer's liability for the acts of' its agents
in Title VII punitive damages. See id. The Court stated that, "in the punitive damages context, an
employer may not he vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial
agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer's 'good-faith efforts to comply with
Title VII.'" Id. (citing Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 130 F.3(1 ¶158, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("rata
J., dissenting), vamfrd, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2139 (1099) ("Kaisiarl P'). Many employers can avoid the
possibility of pm titive damages at trial by implementing and enforcing antidiscrimination policies.
See Id. at 2130.
